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Abstract 
This paper searches for evidence on the additional difficulty the parties have in 
contracting for the transfer of know-how relative to the transfer of patented 
technology. A sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms 
in 1991 is analyzed to find a positive relationship between contract duration and the 
likelihood of transferring know-how in unaffiliated transfers. It is also found that 
technical assistance is bundled together with the transfer of know-how, suggesting 
that the parties try to mitigate opportunistic behavior on the licensor’s side. 
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1. Introduction 
The transmission of tacit knowledge has some problems inherent to it that are not present in 
the transfer of other types of technology. These problems stem from the fact that it is uncodified 
knowledge, which allows neither contracts being written contingent on technology characteristics nor 
legal protection of technology. This characteristic causes moral hazard problems on both sides, first 
described in Arrow (1962). Moral hazard problems are less acute in the case of codified, legally 
protected technology. On the one hand, codification implies that the relevant characteristics of the 
technology can be described, which allows the parties to write contracts contingent on them. On the 
other hand, legal protection against imitation dramatically limits potential moral hazard problems both 
on the licensor and on the licensee’s side. 
This paper studies the determinants of the transfer of patented technology and know-how and 
the role of the provision of technical assistance services in the transfer of tacit knowledge. The 
empirical analysis is carried out using a sample of technology-importing contracts signed by Spanish 
firms in 1991. One of the findings of the paper is that while contract duration has a positive effect on 
the probability of transmission of know-how in unaffiliated transfers, it has no effect on the probability 
of a patent being transferred. Contract duration is defined as the number of years the parties agree the 
relationship to last at the time of signing the contract. Another finding is that the provision of technical 
assistance eliminates the effect of contract duration on the likelihood of transferring know-how. It will 
be argued that this is consistent with technical assistance being used as a safeguard against the licensor 
behaving opportunistically. 
The analysis of international technology transfer is important for its impact on productivity and 
growth, as found, at a macroeconomic level, in Attella and Quintieri (2001), Engelbrecht (1997) or 
Frentzen (1998). Descending to a microeconomic level, although several studies, such as Anton and 
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Yao (1992, 1994) or King (2003) analyze theoretically the transfer of unprotected technology, the 
empirical evidence on the actual licensing procedures is very scarce. Among the few studies using 
transaction-level data, Caves et al (1983) summarize the difficulties faced when transferring technology, 
and Anand and Khanna (2000) find inter-industry differences in contractual practices. Kim (2004) finds 
that the strength of intellectual property protection and prior licensing activity, among other factors, 
increase the propensity of US firms to license their technologies. Macho-Stadler et al (1996) and Mendi 
(2005) use the database employed in this article, although the focus in these articles is on explaining 
scheduled payments.  
Contract duration has not been the main object of theoretical or empirical studies on contracts 
for the international transmission of technology. The temporal dimension of the agreement has been 
typically overlooked in the literature, focusing on difficulties to contract due to asymmetric information 
or the risk inherent to the transmission of the technology, but never considering the case of the 
relationship lasting for several periods. Thus, one of the contributions of this paper is to explicitly 
consider the temporal dimension of contracts and to analyze whether contract duration varies with the 
type of technology to be transferred. 
In this paper, contract duration is considered to be exogenous, and determined by how long will 
the technology be useful before its obsolescence. It is assumed that licensors sell different product 
and/or process technologies with different expected remaining useful lives. Once these useful lives 
expire, technologies become obsolete and therefore, worthless. These remaining useful lives at the time 
of contracting actually determine contract duration. 
The estimated effect of contract duration also suggests that the transfer of know-how is much 
more difficult than that of patented technology. This way, duration affects the likelihood of know-how 
being transferred because longer contracts reduce the scope for moral hazard on both sides. Hence, if 
the relationship is scheduled to be short-lived, the temptation of the parties to breach the contract is 
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greater than in the case of longer relationships (see Klein, 1996). Foreseeing this, the parties may be 
unable to sign an agreement in the first place, and therefore, the observed distribution of contract 
duration in those contracts that include the transmission of know-how will be skewed to the right. 
Regarding the provision of technical assistance services to facilitate the transmission of tacit 
knowledge, Arora (1996) presents evidence of complementary inputs being bundled together with the 
transfer of know-how, arguing that they mitigate moral hazard on the licensor’s side. In the presence of 
potential moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side, technical assistance can be a safeguard against 
this opportunistic behavior. It can be regarded as commitment by the licensor to provide the licensee 
with the first-best level of technology, as long as providing technical assistance is costly to the licensor 
of the technology. Arora (1996) also finds that patents are bundled together with know-how, a result 
not found in the present paper. 
However, a positive relationship between the transfer of know-how and the provision of 
technical assistance should be interpreted with caution, since, by the non-codifiability of know-how, the 
provision of technical assistance is the natural way to transfer tacit knowledge, independently of any 
moral hazard problems. The result obtained in this paper is that transfers of know-how, but not of 
patents, are associated with the provision of technical assistance. The additional result that technical 
assistance eliminates the effect of duration on the likelihood of transferring know-how constitutes 
further evidence consistent with technical assistance mitigating moral hazard problems on the licensor’s 
side. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses how contract duration may 
affect the transfer of know-how and why the parties may be interested in including technical assistance 
in the agreement. Section 3 describes the data, which will be analyzed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes the main conclusions from the empirical analysis carried out in this paper. 
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2. Technology trade, contract duration, and the provision of technical assistance 
This section discusses how the transfers of patented technology and of know-how are 
differently affected by moral hazard problems. Furthermore, it will be discussed how contract duration 
may alter the incentives of the parties to behave opportunistically. The hypotheses to be tested in the 
empirical section will also be presented. 
Patented technology and know-how differ substantially in their tacitness. The former type of 
technology is codified knowledge, which allows for its description and delimitation of what is included 
and what is not included in the patent, and therefore, what is and what is not legally protected against 
imitation. Furthermore, the possibility of describing the object of a patent permits that contracts be 
written based on the characteristics of patented technology, since it is possible for third parties to verify 
these characteristics. By contrast, know-how is tacit, uncodified knowledge. This characteristic prevents 
the parties from writing contracts based on technology characteristics, which are non verifiable by third 
parties. This tacitness also impedes that know-how receive legal protection against imitation. 
There is less room for potential moral hazard problems in the transfer of a patent than in the 
transfer of know-how. In the latter type of transfers, the licensee may renege on payments, and the 
licensor may provide a suboptimal type of technology, see for instance Choi (2001). If this threat is 
serious enough, in some cases the agreement might not be signed at all. In other cases, the parties will 
be forced to include safeguards in order to actually sign the contract. 
In this paper, contract duration refers to what the parties expect the relationship to last given 
their information at the time of signing the contract. This will not always be equal to actual contract 
duration, since some contracts may be terminated early. Incentives to deviate from honest behavior 
differ with contract duration. If the parties sign a short-term contract, they have a smaller incentive to 
cooperate in the successful implementation of the technology than in the case of a longer relationship, 
since the opportunity cost of breaching the contract is greater the longer the remainder of the 
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relationship. Of course, for this effect to exist, there must be some way the non-deviant can punish the 
deviating firm. In the case of the licensee deviating by reneging on its payments due, the licensor can 
license another firm, thus reducing the original licensee’s profits, a reduction that will be increasing in 
contract duration. Similarly, if the licensor does not provide the first-best technology to the licensee so 
as to save in costs, the opportunity cost to the licensor is the fact that it is receiving lower revenues. 
This opportunity cost is also increasing in contract duration. 
Legal protection of technology is crucial in determining how profitable contract breaching is, 
and thus, to analyze whether contract duration will have any effect at all in the likelihood of observing 
specific types of technology being transferred. If legal protection of the technology is strong, for 
instance in a patent licensing contract, the temptation to cheat is reduced. In this case, contract duration 
should not be a factor in determining how likely to be signed these contracts are, and therefore, its 
effect on the likelihood of observing the transfer of a patented technology should be null. 
By contrast, this same argument suggests that the likelihood of know-how being transferred 
should be non-decreasing in contract duration. For some short-term contracts, opportunistic behavior 
by either party may prevent the parties from actually signing the contract. The incentives to not 
behaving opportunistically increase in contract duration, since the profit from continuous cooperation 
more likely exceed the instantaneous gain from deviation. 
This double prediction is precisely what will be tested in the empirical section. Using data from 
contracts for the imports of technology by Spanish firms in 1991, it will be analyzed whether contract 
duration affects the likelihood of observing a patent and know-how. If moral hazard inherent to the 
transfer of know-how is an issue, then duration should positively affect the likelihood of know-how but 
should have no effect in the transfer of a patent. However, evidence on the existence of such 
relationship cannot be regarded as a definitive proof of a direct causality effect of duration on the 
likelihood of transferring know-how, since the observed correlation could well be via a selection effect. 
Page 6 of 26
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6
Furthermore, the available data does not allow the empirical analysis from ruling out alternative 
explanations. Indeed, a positive effect of duration may just come from the fact that the transmission of 
know-how takes longer to be carried out. 
Related to the problems inherent to the transfer of tacit knowledge, the provision of technical 
assistance can be a way to ensure that the licensor indeed supplies the first-best level of technology. In 
some sense, see Arora (1992, 1996), it acts as a commitment device, if the provision of technical 
assistance is costly to the licensor. What will be analyzed empirically is whether technical assistance is 
more likely to be present in transfers of know-how than of patents. Additionally, it will be tested 
whether or not contract duration affects differently the likelihood of including know-how, depending 
on the inclusion of technical assistance in the original agreement. If the provision of technical assistance 
indeed solves the moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side, conditional on moral hazard problems 
on the licensee’s side being relatively less important, then duration should not affect the likelihood of 
transferring know-how in contracts where technical assistance is included. By contrast, in those 
contracts where technical assistance is not included, contract duration should still have a positive effect 
on the probability of transferring tacit knowledge. Evidence for this effect will also be searched for in 
the empirical section. 
 
3. The data 
The dataset is obtained after examination of the records of the Spanish Ministry of Industry. All 
Spanish firms that imported technology were required, up to 1992, to report the terms of the 
technology purchase. The importer of the technology had to file a form, named ‘TE-30’, with the 
‘Servicio de Información y Transferencia de Tecnología’ (Technology Transfer Office), a branch of the 
Spanish Ministry of Industry. In some cases, in addition to this form, the firm included the actual 
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contract, although this was optional. This type of control is no longer allowed by the European Union, 
and thus filing was terminated in 1992. 
The Spanish firm, which was the licensee in all cases, had to describe in this form some features 
of the technology being purchased or licensed. First, the licensee reported whether that technology 
could be classified as a product and/or a process technology. The Spanish firm also indicated whether 
or not the agreement included a transfer of a patent, a utility model (a minor invention also legally 
protected), know-how, an industrial design or software. In some cases, the contract includes the 
transfer of several of these technology types. Out these types of technology, know-how is the only one 
that constitutes tacit knowledge, since the rest of them are codified and receive some legal protection 
against imitation, whereas legal protection is strongest in the case of a patent. In the same form, the 
Spanish firm also reported whether the contract was a licensing contract, where only the right to use a 
given technology was purchased, or it was an actual sale, where the Spanish firm acquired ownership of 
the technology. In the empirical analysis, all the variables constructed using these items will be 
dichotomous, taking values zero or one, since what is observed is the Spanish firm reporting whether 
or not the contract includes the transfer of these technological characteristics.  
Regarding information on the Spanish firm, in addition to the industry of its main activity, it 
reported its sales in the year before the filing of the form. Also included was information on what kind 
of linkages licensor and licensee had, if any. The licensee, when applicable, had to report the percentage 
of its equity owned by the licensor, or if both firms had a common parent. Using this information, the 
observations can be classified into affiliated and unaffiliated. Two parties are affiliated if either there is a 
direct participation of the licensor of 50% or more in the licensee’s equity or if both firms have a 
common parent. The Spanish firm also reported whether it performed R&D, although there was no 
information on the percentage of sales devoted to this activity. Regarding the licensor’s characteristics, 
both its industry and country appear on the form. The form also contains a licensee’s estimate of 
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scheduled payments to be made during the initial five years of the contract, distinguishing between 
fixed and variable payments. If the relationship was scheduled to last longer than five years, the licensee 
was not required to provide an estimate of payments. The impact of some characteristics of the 
transferred technology on payment schemes has been analyzed in Mendi (2005). 
Whenever the contract is filed together with the form, more variables are observable, by 
inspection of the contract clauses. In particular, contracts stipulate the duration of the agreement, 
which is the number of years the parties expect the relationship to last at the time of signing the 
contract. Thus, for those observations where the contract was filed together with the form, the duration 
variable just takes the value specified in the contract. For some cases in which only the form was filed, 
duration can be inferred by observing in what period scheduled payments stopped. In these cases, 
duration is the last year for which positive payments were scheduled. There are some observations for 
which duration is neither observed nor inferred, making duration missing in 27 occasions. 
Concerning the sampling process, the Spanish Ministry of Industry followed no systematic 
criterion in the classification of the forms. They were literally stored in boxes as they were received and 
sent to the archives in a basement located in the central offices of the ministry, in Madrid. This suggests 
that there was no significant bias arising from the sampling procedure, which was to randomly select 
boxes and inspecting the forms contained in them. The sample size is conditioned by the fact that the 
author obtained permission only for two weeks to copy the contents of the forms manually. 
Out of the 5168 forms filed in 1991, which are described in Pérez (1996), the sample used in 
the empirical section of this paper includes 165 observations. 212 observations were collected with a 
clear technological content, since they specified the transfer of a patent, a utility model, an industrial 
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design, know-how, or software (not for resale1). This criterion leaves out of the sample contracts where 
the technological content is less clear, for instance those where the licensee is just a software retailer. In 
addition to the 27 missing values of the duration variable, sales are not reported in 22 cases. This means 
that, out of the mentioned 212 observations with a clear technological content, only 165 observations 
are used in the empirical analysis2.
Table 1 and 1b present selected characteristics of the contracts, classified by industry of the 
licensee. The data have been classified into five industry groups: Agriculture; Energy, Minerals, and 
Chemicals; Metal Transformation; Other Manufacturing and Construction; Services. These industry 
groups correspond to industries 0, 1-2, 3, 4-5, and 6-9 respectively, according to Spanish classification 
of industries (CNAE-74).  
[Insert Tables 1a and 1b here] 
As it can be seen in Table 1a, there is some variation across industries in technology 
characteristics. Most contracts made in Energy, Minerals and Chemicals include the transfer of know-
how, whereas less than half of the contracts in Services, Other Manufacturing, Construction, or 
Agriculture include the transmission of this type of technology. By contrast, the proportion of contracts 
that include the transfer of a patent is highest in Agriculture, and in the remainder industry groups, it is 
below one third. This stresses the fact that patented technology, which has received significant attention 
in the Economics literature, represents a relatively small part of the international market for technology. 
This result also holds when total payments in transfers including a patent and not including one are 
considered. 
 
1 Included in the sample are transfers of software only if it is to be used by the licensee. There are some contracts in the 
sample where the licensee merely acts as a software retailer. These transfers have been explicitly excluded from the final 
sample. 
2 In two cases, neither duration nor sales were observed. 
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The provision of technical assistance services is more frequent in Metal Transformation and 
Services, and rarely observed in Agriculture and Other Manufacturing and Construction. On the other 
hand, process technologies are prevalent in Services, and no contract in Agriculture fall into this 
category. In this paper, a given technology is considered to be of a process type if the licensee classifies 
it as a process but not product technology. 
Table 1b summarizes information on other variables also employed in the empirical analysis. 
Unaffiliated transfers are prevalent in all industries, with Agriculture having the highest percentage, over 
80%. This variable is also dichotomous, taking the value zero if unaffiliated, and one if the transfer is 
made between affiliated parties. The transfer of ownership is rarely observed in these contracts, less 
than 10% overall, implying that most contracts are indeed licensing contracts. Ownership is transferred 
about 15% of the times in Energy, Minerals, and Chemicals and in Metal Transformation, whereas in 
the remainder industries it is rarely transmitted. Duration, measured in years, is also highest in 
Agriculture, and in the neighborhood of five years in the case of the remaining industries, except for 
Services, which presents much shorter contracts on average. Finally, there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity across industries in the licensee’s sales, measured in millions of Spanish pesetas with the 
average firm in Energy, Minerals and Chemicals being 20 times as big as the average firm in Agriculture. 
In the empirical analysis, the logarithm of this variable will be used. 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
This section presents some empirical evidence drawn from the sample of contracts described in 
the previous section. First, evidence is presented on the relationship between know-how, patents, and 
technical assistance. Then, the factors that determine the transfers of patented technology as well as 
know-how are analyzed. Finally, evidence on the role of technical assistance in the transfer of tacit 
knowledge is presented.  
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4.1. Transfers of patents, know-how, and provision of technical assistance services 
Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c are cross tabulations of the indicators of the transfer of a patent, the 
transfer of know-how, and the provision of technical assistance services. First, Table 2a, which cross-
tabulates indicators of the transfer of patents and know-how, shows that rarely is patented technology 
transferred together with tacit knowledge, only 17 out of 165 observations. The non-complementarity 
between these two types of technology is confirmed by the value of the Chi-squared test, which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Tables 2b and 2c are aimed at providing evidence of whether technical assistance is likely to be 
bundled together with a particular type of technology. Table 2b presents the cross tabulation of know-
how and technical assistance. It is clear that the transfer of know-how dramatically increases the 
likelihood of technical assistance being included in the contract. This is confirmed by the value of the 
Chi-squared test, statistically significant at the 1% level. By contrast, analyzing the relationship between 
the transfer of  patented technology and the provision of technical assistance, the result is the opposite: 
Table 2c shows that the transfer of patented technology reduces the likelihood of including technical 
assistance in the contract, with a Chi-squared statistic that is significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, technical assistance seems to be associated with the transfer of know-how, but not with 
that of a patent. This is consistent with the claim that the provision of technical assistance helps to 
mitigate potential moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side, inducing it to transfer the first-best 
level of technology. However, this is not the only candidate explanation, since the relationship between 
know-how and technical assistance could also be due by the very non-codifiability of know-how. 
Indeed, technical assistance, which increases the direct contact between licensor and licensee, is the way 
the parties have to effectively transfer a kind of technology that is not codifiable. Table 4 will present 
further evidence on the role of technical assistance in the transfer of tacit knowledge. 
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4.2. Determinants of the transfer of patents and know-how 
Table 3 presents estimated coefficients in a bivariate Probit model where the dependent 
variables are indicators of the transfer of patented technology and of know-how. This model allows for 
the error terms in both equations to be correlated. The evidence presented in Table 2a indeed suggests 
that such correlation should be taken into account. The specification whose coefficients are estimated is 
the following: 
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i.e. whether patented technology or know-how has been included in the contract. 
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 3 report estimated coefficients of the bivariate probit model using 
the full sample of contracts, whereas columns (iii) and (iv) report estimated coefficient using only 
unaffiliated contracts. The reason to consider the unaffiliated subsample isolately is that there might be 
significant differences between affiliated and unaffiliated transfers. Indeed, the literature typically 
assumes that moral hazard is less likely to be a problem in affiliated transfers. The regressors include 
four industry dummies, one for each industrial group except for Agriculture (Ind variables). Link is a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if the transfer is affiliated, and zero otherwise. Duration is contract 
duration in years. SameInd is a dummy that equals one if both parties to the contract are classified into 
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the same industry. A transfer between two firms in the same industry is assumed to suffer less from 
asymmetric information problems. The lnimpts variable is the logarithm of the percentage of total 
Spanish imports that came from the licensor’s country of origin. It is a measure of asymmetric 
information both on the licensee and the licensor’s side, since a low value of this variable suggests less 
commercial ties between Spain and the licensor’s country, and thus less information about the 
conditions of the Spanish market. Additionally, a low value also suggests that the licensee has less 
information about the licensor. Finally, lnsales is the logarithm of sales of the Spanish firm in the year 
prior to the signing of the contract, which had to be reported in the form. This controls for potential 
differences between large and small firms in the type of technology that they acquire. For instance, if 
the market value of patents is too high then maybe only large firms, which are assumed to be less cash 
constrained, will be able to purchase patented technology. 
None of the coefficients reported in column (i) of Table 3 is statistically significant, except that 
on process technology, which is negative. Thus, most patented technology refers to new products 
rather than improvements in the production of existing products. Neither affiliation nor contract 
duration seem to affect the probability of patented technology being transferred, suggesting that the 
legal protection that a patent receives is strong enough to mitigate possible moral hazard problems on 
both sides. 
By contrast, affiliation, process and the indicator of licensor and licensee belonging to the same 
industry have positive, statistically significant effects in the likelihood of transferring know-how, as seen 
in column (ii). The affiliation variable is indeed significant at the 1% level, suggesting a strong 
relationship between affiliation and the transfer of know-how: internal transfers seem to be preferred 
for the transmission of this type of technology. Duration has no statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of transferring know-how. The coefficients on the industry dummies, which are unreported, 
Page 14 of 26
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
14
are also insignificant in both equations. The logarithm of imports and logarithm of sales variables have 
statistically insignificant effect on the likelihood of transferring either a patent or know-how. 
The fact that there may be significant differences between affiliated and unaffiliated transfers in 
the type of technology to be transferred suggests the separate analysis of unaffiliated contracts, which is 
done in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3. Using the subsample of unaffiliated transfers, the effects of 
the different regressors on the likelihood of transferring a patent are similar to those in column (i). 
Besides the coefficient on process technology, which is negative, highly statistically significant but 
smaller in absolute value than that in column (i), no coefficient is statistically significant. In particular, 
duration does not appear to affect the likelihood of a patent being transferred. Concerning the reported 
estimated coefficients in column (iv), which measures the impact of the regressors on the transfer of 
know-how, those on process and same industry are positive and statistically significant, as they were in 
column (ii) and now they are slightly greater in absolute value. The main difference is that now the 
coefficient on duration is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that unaffiliated 
contracts that stipulate know-how are significantly longer than those that do not include the transfer of 
tacit knowledge. This relationship is consistent with duration reducing the licensor and licensee’s 
incentives to behave opportunistically, as discussed in the previous section. Also, the fact that the effect 
appears only in unaffiliated transfers is consistent with this explanation, since moral hazard problems 
are more acute in arm’s-length transfers. However, there are other explanations consistent with this 
finding, such as the transfer of tacit knowledge, especially to an unaffiliated party, requiring more time 
than that of codified knowledge. 
Additionally, if the parties belong to the same industry, it is more likely that they agree on the 
transfer of know-how, with the coefficient on this variable in column (iv) being positive, statistically 
significant, and greater in absolute value that that reported in column (ii). By its very nature, tacit 
knowledge requires the licensee to be familiar with the procedures that know-how applies to, in a lesser 
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degree than in the case of a patent, where a description of it is available. This could explain the positive 
relationship between the licensor and the licensee belonging to the same industry and the transfer of 
know-how, as well as the insignificant effect on the transfer of a patent. 
 
4.3. The provision of technical assistance services 
Table 4 presents results of regressions that inquire into whether technical assistance is actually 
bundled together with know-how in order to mitigate moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side, as 
proposed in Arora (1996). For that purpose, it will be analyzed if technical assistance eliminates the 
effect of duration on the likelihood of transferring patented technology and know-how, within 
unaffiliated transfers. The evidence suggests that technical assistance actually helps in the transmission 
of know-how, but has no effect if a patent is to be transferred. 
First, column (i) in Table 4 presents estimated marginal effects of a Probit specification where 
the dependent variable is an indicator of the transfer of a patent, and the regressors are the same as in 
the case of equation (1), except for the absence of the affiliation variable, since only the unaffiliated 
subsample will be used, and of industry dummies, because of the low number of observations due to 
the additional splitting of the sample into contracts which include technical assistance and contracts 
which do not include it. In column (i) only observations where the contract does not stipulate the 
provision of technical assistance are used, and no effect is statistically significant, except for that of the 
technology being of a process type. On the other hand, column (ii) uses observations where the 
technical assistance services are provided by the licensor. In this case, duration has a positive marginal 
effect, and becomes statistically significant at the 10% level. If moral hazard on the licensor’s side was a 
major factor driving the likelihood of patented technology being transferred and technical assistance 
helps mitigating this problem, then the effect of duration should have been positive if no technical 
assistance services are provided, and null if technical assistance is provided. 
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Columns (iii) and (iv) do the same exercise but now the dependent variable is, in both cases, an 
indicator of the transmission of know-how. Now the difference between the estimated marginal effects 
of duration in columns (iii) and (iv) provides additional evidence consistent with technical assistance 
helping to mitigate moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side. If no technical assistance is provided, 
the effect of duration is relatively large, increasing the likelihood of know-how being transferred by 
7.7% per year of duration of the contract, and statistically significant at the 1% level. By contrast, in the 
subsample of unaffiliated transfers where technical assistance is provided, the effect of duration is 
much smaller in absolute value, and loses its statistical significance. Thus, in contracts that stipulate the 
provision of technical assistance, contract duration is less relevant in determining the likelihood of 
signing the contract, suggesting that the provision of technical assistance is a partial solution to moral 
hazard on the licensor’s side. It is interesting to stress the asymmetry of this result comparing transfers 
of codified technology with tacit knowledge: technical assistance only helps in the case of tacit 
knowledge, which again suggests that moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side indeed affect the 
likelihood of signing the contract. 
Additionally, the transmission of technical assistance also makes the effect of the same industry 
variable less important, although it remains positive and statistically significant. An interpretation of this 
result is that technical assistance substitutes for lack of knowledge about the usual procedure in a 
different industry. The effect of the logarithm of imports variable is positive, statistically significant, and 
it is not influenced by the transmission of technical assistance: know-how tends to be acquired from 
countries with closer commercial ties with Spain regardless to the efforts made by the parties to reduce 
moral hazard on the licensor’s side. This again is consistent with asymmetric information on variables 
other than technology characteristics worsening moral hazard problems on both sides. 
Finally, the provision of technical assistance dramatically changes the effect of the licensee’s 
size, switching from it being positive and statistically significant at the 5% level to negative and 
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statistically significant at the 1% level. A candidate explanation is that when no technical assistance is 
provided, mostly larger firms acquire tacit knowledge because they can more easily bear the loss from 
possible moral hazard on the licensor’s side, and thus, the likelihood of the contract actually being 
signed is smaller if the licensee is of a smaller size. On the other hand, if technical assistance is 
provided, then there is less room for opportunistic behavior on the licensor’s side, and thus, the true 
distribution of licensees’ sizes appears, with smaller firms more likely acquiring tacit knowledge. An 
alternative explanation is that small firms lack the resources to maintain a permanent technical staff, 
making them more dependent on technical assistance provided by the licensor. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the determinants of the transmission of patented and of tacit technology, 
with an emphasis on the effect of contract duration and on the role of the inclusion of technical 
assistance. With this purpose, a sample of 165 contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish 
firms from foreign sources in 1991 is analyzed empirically. 
The analysis of the sample presents evidence of the positive effect of contract duration on the 
probability of transferring tacit knowledge in unaffiliated transactions. By contrast, duration has no 
effect if patented knowledge is to be transferred, regardless of the linkages between licensor and 
licensee. An explanation for the difference between the two effects could be the legal protection that a 
patent receives, which is absent if tacit knowledge is to be transferred. This constitutes a potential 
source of moral hazard problems on the licensee’s side. Additionally, the fact that tacit knowledge is 
uncodified may be an additional source of moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side. If the parties 
sign a long-term contract, then moral hazard problems are less acute because the opportunity cost of 
opportunistic behavior increases. Since the legal protection and codification of a patent reduce the 
temptation to cheat, duration has no effect in this type of transfers, but the transfer of know-how, 
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lacking these two features, is sensitive to duration, which changes the parties’ incentives to breach the 
contract. 
In addition to the previous argument, the positive effect of contract duration on the likelihood 
of transferring know-how could also work by means of an increase in the likelihood of the parties 
actually signing the contract if duration is long. If know-how is to be transferred and the expected 
duration of the technology is short, then the potential moral hazard problems on both sides may be so 
acute that the parties are not able to reach a successful agreement. The fact that duration affects the 
likelihood of observing the transfer of know-how only within unaffiliated transfers suggests that the 
problems associated with its transmission may be an important determinant in the successful transfer of 
tacit knowledge. 
The paper also investigates wheth r the parties include the provision of technical assistance as a 
way to solve moral hazard problems on the licensor’s side. Technical assistance can be seen as a 
commitment by the licensor to provide the licensee with the first-best level of technology, if 
contracting upon technological characteristics is impossible. The evidence presented in Tables 2 and 4 
is consistent with the claim that these services are indeed used by the parties for this purpose: technical 
assistance is associated with the transfer of know-how, but not of a patent, and the provision of 
technical assistance services makes the effect of contract duration in the likelihood of transferring 
know-how be statistically insignificant. 
The evidence presented in this paper is, therefore, consistent with opportunistic behavior being 
an important determinant of international transfers of technology. However, the data that is available 
prevent this evidence from being fully conclusive, since there could be other explanations for the 
results in Tables 2 and 3 not based on the interpretation proposed in this paper. However, the results 
presented in Table 4, indicating the different role of technical assistance depending on the technology 
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type, constitutes additional evidence in favor of the explanation proposed in this paper. It would be 
interesting to study whether this result is also found in other similar datasets. 
The results obtained in this paper suggest that the legal protection offered by the patent system 
in Spain in 1991 was sufficient to ensure that two unaffiliated parties interested in transferring 
ownership or the right to use a patent were not refrained by potential moral hazard problems. By 
contrast, the transfer of know-how was much more difficult because of its lack of legal protection and 
its tacitness. Technical assistance services are introduced as a partial solution to this problem, but 
whenever this service was not provided, the probability of transferring know-how depended on factors 
such as contract duration, which determined how acute moral hazard problems were to be. Moreover, 
it was precisely smaller firms the most likely to forgo the possibility of acquiring tacit knowledge. 
Finally, the results obtained in this paper should also induce models that analyze contracts for 
the transfer of technology to explicitly consider its temporal dimension. To the best of my knowledge, 
all papers in this field consider instantaneous transfers of technology and analyze how moral hazard, 
asymmetric information, or risk-sharing influence scheduled payments or the inclusion of certain 
contract clauses. The fact that contracts differ in their durations has been overlooked in the literature, 
and in my opinion, deserves more attention. 
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Table 1a. Contract and firm characteristics by industry 
 
Industry Total Know-how Patented 
technology
Technical 
assistance
Process 
technology
Obs. % % % % 
 
Agriculture (0) 5 40.0 40.0 20.0 0.0
Energy, Minerals, Chemicals (1-2) 41 85.4 29.3 51.2 51.2
Metal Transformation (3) 58 65.5 27.6 56.9 43.1
Other Manufacturing, Construction (4-5) 29 42.3 20.7 24.1 44.8
Services (6-9) 32 40.6 6.3 56.3 78.1
Total 165 61.8 23.0 48.5 50.9
Table 1b. Contract and firm characteristics by industry 
 
Industry Unaffiliated Ownership Duration Average 
sales 
% % years (pta mn)
Agriculture (0) 80.0 0.0 7.6 1260
Energy, Minerals, Chemicals (1-2) 70.7 17.1 4.8 26992
Metal Transformation (3) 69.0 15.5 4.7 23799
Other Manufacturing, Construction (4-5) 58.6 3.4 4.7 6210
Services (6-9) 71.9 3.2 2.7 24208
Total 68.5 10.9 4.4 20897
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Table 2a. Transfers of know-how and patented technology 
 
No patent Patent Total 
No know-how 42 21 63
Know-how 85 17 102
Total 127 38 165
Pearson Chi-square 6.103
Probability   0.013
Table 2b. Transfers of know-how and technical assistance 
 
No technical 
assistance 
Technical 
assistance 
Total 
No know-how 44 19 63
Know-how 41 61 102
Total 85 80 165
Pearson Chi-square 13.703
Probability   0.000
Table 2c. Transfers of patented technology and technical assistance
No technical 
assistance 
Technical 
assistance 
Total 
No patent 57 70 127
Patent 28 10 38
Total 85 80 165
Pearson Chi-square 9.714
Probability   0.000
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Table 3. Bivariate Probit of transfer of patented technology and know-how 
 
Full sample Unaffiliated subsample 
Patent Know-how Patent Know-how 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Affiliation 0.19 0.763 ***
0.254 0.249
Process -0.937 *** 0.451 * -0.651 ** 0.581 *
0.249 0.238 0.357 0.311
Duration -0.028 0.029 0.004 0.127 ***
0.034 0.033 0.046 0.046
Same industry -0.089 0.425 * -0.014 0.668 **
0.255 0.245 0.315 0.304
ln(imports) -0.052 0.079 -0.001 0.132
0.119 0.107 0.134 0.125
ln(sales) 0.054 -0.066 0.062 -0.037
0.546 0.051 0.062 0.059
Constant -0.228 -0.656 -0.393 -2.25 **
0.8 0.784 0.975 0.964
Log-likelihood -159.858 -108.161
Sample size 165 113
All regressions include industry dummies. 
Standard errors reported below the estimated coefficient. 
* indicates statistically significant at the 90% level (two-tailed test). 
** indicates statistically significant at the 95% level (two-tailed test). 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 99% level (two-tailed test). 
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Table 4. Technical assistance as a safeguard against opportunistic behavior 
 
Patented technology Know-how 
No technical 
assistance 
Technical 
assistance 
No technical 
assistance 
Technical 
assistance 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Process -0.278 ** -0.031 0.36 ** -0.113
0.12 0.099 0.141 0.167
Duration 0.001 0.022 * 0.077 *** 0.024
0.019 0.012 0.027 0.022
Same industry -0.001 0.038 0.418 *** 0.281 *
0.126 0.096 0.127 0.165
ln(imports) -0.007 0.022 0.134 * 0.135 *
0.056 0.044 0.072 0.067
ln(sales) 0.027 0.022 0.078 ** -0.086 ***
0.025 0.019 0.035 0.032
Log-likelihood -32.913 -17.688 -31.631 -23.042
Sample size 61 52 61 52
Standard errors reported below the estimated coefficient. 
* indicates statistically significant at the 90% level (two-tailed test). 
** indicates statistically significant at the 95% level (two-tailed test). 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 99% level (two-tailed test). 
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